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Our study examines the effect of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) on the valuations of 
U.S. target firms in acquisition deals. The TCJA was the single most extensive revision of the 
U.S. tax code in more than 30 years and introduced a complete overhaul of the corporate tax 
system, substantially reducing taxes for U.S. corporations. Using data from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Zephyr and Orbis databases, we match U.S. targets with comparable foreign target firms before 
and after the implementation of the TCJA using a Propensity Score Matching model. 
Subsequently, we run a Difference-in-Differences regression on our matched sample to 
estimate the effect of the TCJA.  
We find that the TCJA increased the value of the average U.S. target firm by 32%. Our findings 
provide evidence that U.S. firms were systematically undervalued relative to their foreign 
competitors prior to the TCJA and that the reform induced a valuation premium on U.S. firms 
relative to similar foreign firms. We find no evidence for an increase in target valuations in 
anticipation of a future tax reform similar to the one observed in public firm valuations 
(Gaertner et al., 2019; Wagner et al., 2018, 2020). The valuation effect is concentrated among 
domestic firms as there is no significant increase in the valuations of U.S. multinational 
corporations. We also find that the valuation increase is greater for manufacturing firms than 
service providers and that high-value firms likely benefitted the most from the tax reform. 
Overall, our results provide evidence that the TCJA made U.S. targets more attractive for 
acquirers.    
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The 2017 U.S. tax reform, known as the “Tax Cut and Jobs Act” (TCJA), is the single most 
extensive tax reform in the U.S. since 1986. The Act, which was passed by the Senate and 
House on December 20th and signed into law by President Trump on December 22nd, introduced 
major changes to the Internal Revenue Code for both individuals and corporations. An overhaul 
of the corporate tax system was by many considered overdue since the U.S. had one of the 
highest corporate statutory tax rates among advanced economies and was one of few countries 
to enforce a worldwide tax system. According to critics, this led U.S. firms to operate with a 
significant disadvantage in the interconnected global economy. The TCJA aimed to increase 
the competitiveness of U.S. firms. Some of the most significant changes were a reduction in 
the federal statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and a move towards a territorial tax 
system. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee on Taxation (2017) 
estimated that the TCJA would save corporations an estimated $644 billion in taxes in the ten 
years from 2018 to 2027, thus having a large financial impact on U.S. firms. 
An anticipated effect of a corporate tax reduction of this magnitude would be an increase in the 
valuations of U.S. firms. Our study aims to quantify this valuation effect by analyzing data on 
global acquisitions. This is interesting for two reasons. First, company valuations provide 
insight into the attractiveness of U.S. firms to investors. An increase in the valuations of U.S. 
firms following the TCJA would indicate that the reform successfully increased the 
competitiveness of U.S. firms and reduced the favorability gap between the U.S. and foreign 
tax systems. While previous studies on the TCJA have primarily focused on the market 
valuations of public firms (Chen & Koester, 2020; Gaertner et al., 2019; Wagner et al., 2018, 
2020), our study contributes to this literature by studying the valuations of U.S. target firms in 
acquisition deals.  
Second, the political motivation of the TCJA’s corporate tax reductions was that it would spur 
economic growth and increase the wages of middle-class Americans (The Council of Economic 
Advisors, 2017). If the TCJA proves to increase company valuations through tax savings, one 
of the main beneficiaries will be U.S. firms' owners. Since this group was not publicly 
announced to be the target for the corporate tax reductions, it will provide interesting insights 
into how observed consequences of tax policies differ from political goals. Contemporary 
studies find that the TCJA benefited business owners by increasing dividends and share 
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repurchases (Kalcheva et al., 2020). Our study contributes to this by examining if U.S. business 
owners received additional benefits through increased target valuations in acquisition deals.  
To estimate the effect of the TCJA on target valuations, we use a global sample of acquisition 
deals in the period 2010 to 2019 collected from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database. Our final 
sample consists of 4,046 global acquisition deals, of which 782 include U.S. targets. With a 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) algorithm, we match each transaction of a U.S. target with 
a transaction of a comparable foreign target based on company characteristics. This eliminates 
bias caused by the underlying differences between U.S. and foreign firms that might affect 
company valuations. Subsequently, we run a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression on the 
matched sample before and after the TCJA. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the 
TCJA positively impacted target valuations, increasing their value by 32% on average. 
Our results also show that U.S. firms were systematically undervalued relative to foreign firms 
in the period prior to the reform, possibly providing evidence of an uncompetitive tax system. 
We also test if the anticipation of a future tax cut already affected target valuations in deals 
immediately following the 2016 election where the Republicans took control over both the 
executive (President) and legislative (Congress) branches of government and the likelihood of 
a corporate tax reform substantially increased. Previous research has shown that the 
expectations of the TCJA increased valuations in the stock market (Gaertner et al., 2019; 
Wagner et al., 2018, 2020). We find no such effect for target valuations in acquisition deals, 
likely because of acquisitions representing long-term business decisions, thus delaying the 
market reactions. 
Noting that there appears to be strong heterogeneity in the impact of the TCJA on different 
businesses (Amberger & Robinson, 2020; Bennett et al., 2019; Dyreng et al., 2020; Hanlon et 
al., 2019; Kalcheva et al., 2020; Wagner et al., 2020), we complement our main analysis with 
several heterogeneity tests. Following Dyreng et al. (2020), we first test whether the valuation 
effect differed between U.S. domestic- and multinational corporations (MNCs). Our results 
show that MNCs were mostly unaffected by the tax reform and that domestic firms were the 
greater beneficiaries of the corporate tax cuts in the TCJA. This is likely due to the new taxes 
imposed on MNCs through the GILTI, FDII, and BEAT provisions. We also find that the 
valuation effect of the TCJA is concentrated in the manufacturing sector rather than services, 
an effect mainly associated with the tax advantages of the new bonus depreciation in the TCJA. 
7 
Lastly, we split the sample at the median of deal total target value and find that high-value 
firms likely benefited more from the TCJA than low-value firms. Thus, our findings 
complement the research by Wagner et al. (2020) by looking at the TCJA’s impact on high-
and low-value firms' valuations rather than their effective tax rates only.  
We begin in section 2 with an overview of the main changes in the TCJA likely to have the 
most significant effect on U.S. firms' valuations. We continue in section 3 by developing our 
hypotheses and reviewing existing literature on valuations and taxes. In section 4, we outline 
our empirical approach, while section 5 discusses the results of our analyses. Section 6 contains 
our concluding remarks.  
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2. Main corporate tax changes of the TCJA  
The TCJA altered numerous provisions in the U.S. tax system that might affect the valuations 
of U.S. firms. As a detailed breakdown of all changes in the TCJA fall beyond the scope of this 
paper, this section describes the main changes to the U.S. tax system likely to have the biggest 
effect on the valuations of U.S. firms. Table 1 below summarizes these effects.   
Table 1: Summary of the most substantial provisions of the TCJA 
Below is a summary of the most important provisions assumed to affect the valuations of U.S. firms. Note that the effects are expected and 
will not necessarily affect the valuations in line with the hypothesized effects. The tax bill is more than 500 pages long and contains 
numerous alterations that could affect corporations differently than expected dependent on firm-specific factors. 
 
TCJA Provision  
Lower federal 
statutory 
corporate tax rate 
Short summary: The corporate income tax rate was reduced from 35% to 21%. 
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +     U.S. firms pay less tax and become more profitable. Investors are 
expected to pay more for U.S. firms.  
       +     Lower taxes will give U.S. firms more cash that could be spent on 
acquisitions. 




Short summary: The repatriation tax on foreign income was removed for 
income earned after the introduction of the TCJA. 
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +     U.S. firms with accumulated unrepatriated earnings bring the cash 
back and invest it at home, in addition to engage more in domestic M&As. 
       -      Foreign investments previously not profitable become attractive to U.S 
investors, increasing U.S. firm’s desire to invest internationally rather than 
domestically. 
Global intangible 
low tax income 
(GILTI)  
Short summary: The U.S. will tax income accumulated by intangible assets in 
low-tax countries at a rate of 10.5%  
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +     Investments in low-tax countries become less profitable. MNCs are 
expected to invest more domestically, including domestic M&As  
       -      GILTI imposes a new tax on U.S. MNCs. This could increase their 




Short summary: “Intangible income” earned in foreign countries will be taxed 
at a discounted rate of 13.125%.    
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +      U.S. companies are incentivized to serve foreign markets through 
export of services rather than to invest abroad.   
       +      More intellectual property could be located in the U.S., causing a 
spillover effect on the economy long-term.  
Base erosion and 
anti-abuse tax 
(BEAT) 
Short summary: Large MNCs will receive a minimum BEAT tax added to 
their tax bill if it exceeds their regular tax bill.  
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +      The benefit of reducing profits in the U.S. through buying services 
from a foreign owned subsidiary is reduced. This lessens the incentives for 
MNCs to invest abroad.   
       -        BEAT imposes a new tax on large U.S. MNCs. This could increase 
their overall taxation and decrease their valuations.  
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2.1 The reduction in the federal statutory corporate tax rate 
The federal statutory corporate tax rate reduction from 35% to 21% is arguably the biggest 
change introduced by the TCJA to the U.S. corporate tax system. Prior to the TCJA 
implementation, the United States corporate tax rate was considered one of the highest in the 
world. The neoclassical perspective on investments is that investors will seek the most 
profitable investment opportunities both domestically and globally, determined by the after-
tax rate of return. Thus, although the statutory tax rate was indeed higher in the U.S. relative to 
most other countries prior to the TCJA, this rate is not necessarily an appropriate metric to 
compare the relative attractiveness of the U.S. tax system to potential investors due to the 
existence of deductions, subsidies, loopholes, and credits.  
A commonly used measure for corporations' overall tax burden is the effective average tax rate 
(EATR), introduced by Devereux and Griffith (2003). In a 2019 report for the European 
Commission, the EATRs of all EU and some non-EU countries are compared (Heckemeyer et 
al., 2019). The U.S. EATR was reduced from 36.5% in 2017 to 27.5% in 2019, while the EU 
EATR2 fell from 20.0% to 19.7% in the same period. Thus, the TCJA’s reduction in the 
statutory rate also led to a decline in the EATR, significantly reducing the EATR gap between 
the U.S. and the average EU country. This shows that although the U.S. EATR decreased 
considerably due to the TCJA, U.S. firms still operate at a disadvantage relative to the average 
firm in the EU even after the reform. 
A review by The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation (2017) find that the TCJA will save corporations an estimated $644 billion in taxes 
in the ten years from 2018 to 2027, contributing to an increase in the deficit of $1,455 billion 
 
2 The EU EATR is calculated as an arithmetic mean of each EATR of the 28 EU member states (including the United 
Kingdom). We use the EU EATR as a comparison to the U.S. EATR since the EU is one of the most important trading partners 
of the U.S. (in addition to China, Mexico, and Canada).  
Table 1 (continued) 
 




Short summary: The first-year bonus depreciation was increased from 50% to 
100% for most depreciable business assets and certain property. 
Expected effects on the valuations of U.S. firms: 
       +    The new rules positively impact firms with qualified assets for bonus 
depreciation (such as manufacturers) due to a significant increase in current-




over the next ten years. CBO’s estimates proved to be largely accurate for 2018 and 2019, with 
the federal deficit for fiscal 2019 increasing by 47% to $984 billion compared to 2017, and 
corporate income tax revenue as a percentage of GDP dropping to 1.1% (Bogusz et al., 2020). 
Thus, it is clear that the TCJA has indeed constituted a significant decrease in the overall 
taxation burden for U.S. corporations. This could have increased their relative attractiveness 
for both domestic and foreign investors, increasing their valuations.  
2.2 The abolishment of the repatriation tax 
Another major change introduced by the TCJA is the transition from a worldwide tax system 
to a hybrid between a territorial and a worldwide system. Prior to the TCJA, U.S. MNCs were 
required to pay taxes on foreign income to the U.S. government. This tax, however, was only 
payable upon the repatriation of these earnings. The policy discouraged repatriation and placed 
corporations that wanted to reinvest foreign earnings in the U.S. at a disadvantage. As a result, 
the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that U.S. MNCs in 2015 held more than $2.6 trillion 
overseas (TPC, 2020). The TCJA effectively abolished the old repatriation tax, but to avoid 
benefiting corporations with accumulated unrepatriated earnings, these earnings were taxed 
regardless of repatriation. The TCJA required a one-time transition tax of 15.5% on liquid 
assets and 8% on non-liquid assets, substantially lower than the previous rate of 35% minus 
applicable foreign tax credits. Data from the Commerce Department (2019) show that more 
than $1 trillion of overseas profits was brought back in 2018 and 2019, indicating that the new 
provisions had the expected effect of an increase in repatriation.  
On the one hand, the cash brought back following the TCJA could increase U.S. investments, 
possibly increasing the valuations of U.S. firms. On the other hand, foreign investments are 
likely to have become more attractive for U.S. firms due to the new hybrid tax system. This 
could increase U.S. firms' desire to invest internationally rather than domestically, potentially 
decreasing the valuations of U.S. target firms.  
2.3 Global intangible low tax income (GILTI) 
The TCJA introduced a hybrid tax system rather than a pure territorial tax system. One of the 
main alterations forming this hybrid model is the new Global Intangible Low Tax Income 
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(GILTI) provisions, which were introduced to discourage profit shifting to low-tax countries 
abroad. GILTI imposes a tax on what is deemed “intangible income” from U.S. MNCs' foreign 
affiliates, i.e., above-normal returns assumed to be earned from intangible assets such as 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights (TPC, 2020). The GILTI framework sets the average 
expected return to 10% on foreign depreciable tangible assets and introduced a 10.5% 
minimum tax (assuming a foreign tax rate of zero) on any excess returns, payable immediately. 
Thus, investments in low-tax countries are likely to become less profitable, and U.S. MNCs 
are expected to invest more domestically, possibly increasing U.S. target valuations. 
Furthermore, since the GILTI provisions target U.S. MNCs with additional taxes, the 
valuations of such firms could decrease. 
2.4 Foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) 
Another important provision in the TCJA, which is closely related to GILTI, is the introduction 
of a special tax rate for what is considered to be Foreign Derived Intangible Income (FDII). 
While GILTI discourages placing intangible assets abroad through a minimum tax, FDII 
encourages U.S. MNCs to hold valuable intangible assets in the U.S. through a tax deduction. 
Specifically, FDII establishes a 13.125% maximum tax rate for income3 exceeding a 10% 
return on its depreciable tangible assets, significantly lower than the standard rate of 21% (TPC, 
2020).  
Combined, the GILTI-FDII framework makes foreign investments less attractive, discourages 
profit-shifting, and incentives corporations to rather serve foreign markets through exports4. 
While the GILTI provisions could increase the overall taxation of U.S. MNCs (reducing their 
valuations), the FDII provisions could reduce their overall taxation (increasing their valuations) 
depending on what portion of their income is foreign-derived and thus qualifies for the reduced 
tax rate. It is unclear which effect has the strongest impact on valuations as this is determined 
by firm-specific factors. However, the GILTI-FDII framework is expected to have limited 
 
3 Only the fraction of the corporation’s revenue that is foreign-derived is eligible for the reduced rate. The maximum tax rate 
rises to 16.406% after 2025.   
4 An increase in the amount of intangible assets being located in the U.S could have a spillover effect on U.S. economic growth 
in the long term and therefore impact valuations. Studies have shown that intellectual property (IP) rights affect economic 
growth indirectly by stimulating factor accumulation (Park & Ginarte, 1997). Thus, by having important IP located in the U.S. 
rather than abroad, they are likely easier to protect from economic aggression such as forced technology transfer, industrial 
espionage, and conditioned market access from U.S. trading partners, of which China is believed to be the primary IP infringer. 
While the topic of IP infringement is controversial and used to justify the ongoing trade war between the U.S. and China, a 
2018 report from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (2018) estimates the annual Chinese theft of American IP to cost 
the U.S. economy between $225 billion and $600 billion annually, causing major damage to every industry. 
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impact on domestic target firms, possibly causing a heterogeneous valuation effect between 
domestic firms and MNCs. 
2.5 Base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) 
Another provision contributing to the hybrid tax system is the new Base Erosion and Anti-
Abuse Tax (BEAT). As a reaction to the limited effectiveness of the old regulations regarding 
transfer pricing, the TCJA introduced a domestic add-on minimum tax on deductible payments 
to foreign affiliates to limit future cross-border profit-shifting. The BEAT disallows certain 
payments to related foreign parties to be fully deducted as business costs by imposing an 
alternative minimum tax.  U.S. corporations first calculate their regular tax liability using the 
corporate income tax rate of 21%, and then recalculates their tax using a lower BEAT rate of 
10%5 after adding back the deductible payments to related foreign parties. If the BEAT liability 
is higher than the regular tax liability, the corporations must pay an add-on tax equal to the 
amount by which the BEAT exceeds the regular tax (TPC, 2020).  
However, this additional tax is only applicable to large MNCs with more than $500 million in 
gross receipts or that makes more than 3% of their total deductible payments to foreign 
affiliates. Thus, the BEAT further lessens MNCs' incentives to invest abroad, potentially 
increasing domestic acquisition activity and target valuations. However, for MNCs with large 
payments to foreign affiliates, the BEAT could also increase the overall taxation and reduce 
their valuations. This could strengthen the heterogeneous valuation effect between domestic 
firms and MNCs potentially caused by the GILTI-FDII framework.  
2.6 Bonus depreciation deduction 
The TCJA made many changes to eligible tax expenditures for both individuals and 
corporations. The largest change on the corporate side is considered to be the enactment of a 
100% bonus depreciation. The provision temporarily allows 100% immediate expensing of 
most depreciable business assets and certain property acquired and placed in service after 
September 27th, 2017 and before January 1st, 2023 (TPC, 2020). The bonus depreciation is 
 
5 The BEAT rate was 5% in 2018 and will be 10% in 2019 through 2025. From 2026 and beyond, the BEAT rate is 12.5%.  
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phased down in 20 percentage point increments in the following four years until it is fully 
eliminated after 2026. Prior to the TCJA, the law only allowed a 50% first-year bonus 
depreciation in 2017, which would be phased out by the end of 2019.  
The new 100% bonus depreciation applies to depreciable business assets with a recovery period 
of 20 years or less, thus generally including most business assets such as machinery, equipment, 
and computers (IRS, 2019). It gives corporations the ability to recover the asset cost of new 
investments quicker, more appropriately reflecting the time value of money. This could reduce 
the taxation for firms in asset-heavy industries with qualified business assets, increasing their 
valuations. This could cause a heterogeneous valuation effect between asset-heavy and asset-
light firms.  
We continue in Section 3 by developing our hypotheses based on related literature on target 




3. Hypothesis development and prior literature 
As evident from the previous section, the tax reform is complicated and could affect target 
valuations differently depending on firm-specific factors. There are two main channels through 
which the TCJA could affect target valuations. First, the corporate income tax rate reduction 
will increase the profitability of the targets and thereby their value for potential acquirers. U.S. 
acquirers will also have more available funds that could be spent on acquisitions. Second, the 
TCJA could change the behavior of certain U.S. firms. Investments in business assets or 
property deemed unprofitable in the old tax system can be profitable under the new system and 
thus be carried out. Ideally, our analysis should catch only the first effect, specifically the 
increase in valuations due to lower taxes. 
3.1 Main hypothesis: the TCJA increased the valuations of 
U.S. target firms 
3.1.1 Increased profitability of U.S. targets      
As investors are shown to place a valuation premium on tax avoidance (Wang, 2011), the main 
driver of a potential increase in valuations is likely to be the significant reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate. An acquirer will pay less tax on the target's future earnings and thus 
be expected to pay more in an acquisition of a U.S. target firm. An important contribution to 
the literature is Huizinga, Voget, and Wagner’s (2012) study on who bears the burden of 
additional taxation in international M&As. They find a one-to-one relationship between 
increased taxes and reduced deal premiums, suggesting that an extra dollar in taxation is paid 
fully by the target firm’s owners in a multinational deal. Assuming that this relationship holds 
when the corporate tax rate is reduced, the owners of U.S. firms will be the primary 
beneficiaries of the tax reductions in the TCJA through higher valuations. 
The reduced corporate tax rate could also be a driver for increased valuations of U.S. firms 
through an increase in foreign investments. While relatively little is known about the TCJA’s 
effects on acquisitions due to its recent passage, research on previous tax reforms provides 
some insights. Following the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, the last major overhaul of the 
U.S. tax system prior to the TCJA, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 50% to 35%. Studies 
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by Scholes and Wolfson (1990) and Servaes and Zenner (1994) both find that the benefits of 
foreign acquisitions in the U.S. depend on the U.S. tax system and that the level of foreign 
acquisitions in the U.S. increased significantly following the enactment of TRA. Since the 
TRA's corporate tax rate reduction resembles the one in the TCJA, the level of foreign 
investments in the U.S. is likely to increase following the TCJA. An anticipated effect of this 
is an increase in the valuations of U.S. firms.  
Furthermore, the relationship between taxes and the investment level in a country has been 
thoroughly studied. Reduced taxes are associated with an increase in cross-border investments 
as the cost of capital is reduced (Mooij & Ederveen, 2008). Multiple studies that focus on cross-
border M&As find that lower corporate taxes lead to an increase in cross-border M&A activity 
(di Giovanni, 2005; Erel et al., 2012; Rossi & Volpin, 2004). Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) 
study the effect of cross-border M&As on U.S. firms' valuations by looking at the wealth gains 
of shareholders. They find that U.S. shareholders' wealth gains were significantly higher in 
cross-border M&As compared to domestic M&As, implying that an increase in cross-border 
M&As in the U.S. leads to higher target valuations. As these effects are likely to be transferable 
to the TCJA due to the significant decrease in corporate taxes, it should increase the value of 
U.S. firms and possibly induce a valuation premium relative to foreign firms.  
3.1.2 Increased funds for U.S. acquirers 
The tax cuts can also increase U.S. firms' valuations by stimulating demand through reduced 
taxes, thus increasing available funds for acquirers. This effect is mainly caused by the 
significant reduction in the corporate income tax rate, but it is also likely to be affected by the 
abolishment of the repatriation tax, which could affect U.S. firms' valuations in two different 
directions.  
In 2004, the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) introduced a temporary repatriation tax 
holiday, which led financially constrained U.S. MNCs to increase their domestic investments 
following the repatriation of foreign earnings (Faulkender & Petersen, 2012). While U.S. 
corporations brought back an estimated $300 billion during the temporary repatriation tax 
holiday of AJCA (Browning, 2008), $1 trillion was brought back in the first two years under 
the TCJA (Commerce Department, 2019). Since the repatriation effects of AJCA and TCJA 
were similar, the TCJA should increase U.S. firm’s ability and desire to invest domestically if 
such investments are deemed more beneficial than foreign investments under the new tax 
system. Early evidence has shown that the TCJA was successful in reducing tax distortions to 
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outbound M&A activity (Amberger & Robinson, 2020), resulting in an overall decreased 
probability that a U.S. firm acquires a foreign target after the TCJA. This could increase the 
valuations of U.S. firms.  
However, empirical evidence from the abolishment of the repatriation taxes in the U.K. and 
Japan indicates that firms in both countries increased their foreign investments after the 
abolishment (Feld et al., 2016). Amberger and Robinson (2020) also find that firms with no 
significant foreign presence prior to the TCJA were more likely to engage in foreign M&As 
after the TCJA. Since less than 1% of U.S. companies are considered multinationals 
(McKinsey, 2010), the TCJA could thus increase the majority of U.S. firms’ desire to invest 
internationally rather than domestically, potentially yielding a negative effect on the valuations 
of U.S. firms.  
It is important to note that an increase in available funds does not necessarily lead to increased 
acquisition spending. There are many other possible ways for corporations to use additional 
funds. In a survey of tax executives following the AJCA of 2004, Graham et al. (2010) found 
that repatriated cash was mainly used in down payments of domestic debt, repurchasing of 
shares, and capital investment. Empirical studies (Blouin & Krull, 2009; Dharmapala et al., 
2011) have found that the main effect of increased repatriations is an increase in payments to 
shareholders through share buybacks and dividends. However, the decisions to buy back shares 
or acquire a firm are not mutually exclusive actions. Cash-rich firms are shown to be more 
likely to pursue acquisitions (Harford, 1999). Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that 
additional available cash will increase the overall acquisition activity in the U.S. 
Of the two effects discussed, U.S. targets' increased profitability is likely to be the primary 
driver of increased target valuations. Overall, the TCJA is expected to have made U.S. targets 
more attractive for both domestic and foreign investors. The main hypothesis of this paper is 
the following: 
H1: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 increased the valuations of U.S. target firms in 
acquisition deals. 
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3.2 Secondary hypotheses 
Previous literature has shown that the effects of the TCJA differ substantially across firms. 
Hanlon et al. (2019) find that share buybacks increased after the TCJA, but the effect was 
concentrated among a handful of large firms. Bennett et al. (2019) find a decrease in debt for 
highly levered firms, while Dyreng et al. (2020) find that U.S. domestic firms received a larger 
decrease in their effective tax rate than U.S. MNCs. Amberger and Robinson (2020) find that 
U.S. MNCs were less likely to make foreign acquisitions after the TCJA, while U.S. firms 
without a foreign presence became more likely to acquire a foreign firm. Kalcheva et al. (2020) 
and Wagner et al. (2020) both find that highly taxed firms received the greatest benefits from 
the TCJA.  
Since there seems to be strong heterogeneity in the impact of the TCJA on different businesses, 
we complement our main analysis with several heterogeneity tests. Specifically, we study 
potential differences between domestic and multinational firms, manufacturers and service 
providers, and high- and low-value firms. Thus, our analysis could provide additional support 
for the heterogeneous effects found in other studies.   
3.2.1 Domestic vs. MNCs 
Multiple provisions in the TCJA only affect multinational firms. The BEAT provisions reduce 
the incentives for U.S. MNCs to undertake investments that involve outgoing payments from 
the U.S. since the new provisions limit their ability to erode the U.S. tax base through profit 
shifting. As a result, it has the potential to impose new taxes on the international income of 
U.S. MNCs that were previously only taxed at low rates abroad. In addition, foreign-derived 
income meeting the requirements of the GILTI provisions are taxable immediately.  
A recent study found that while both domestic and MNCs benefited from the TCJA, the 
domestic firms benefited the most (Dyreng et al., 2020). The effect was attributed to an 
unchanged federal tax burden on foreign earnings due to the new anti-abuse provisions. 
Consequently, all tax savings for U.S. MNCs came from their domestic activities rather than a 
reduced effective tax rate on foreign income. Another study found that the TCJA had a net 
negative short-term impact on the valuations of firms with the greatest foreign exposure (Huang 
et al., 2020). The effect is attributed to an overall increase in the tax liability for such 
corporations due to the GILTI and BEAT provisions, in addition to loopholes being closed that 
were previously used in tax minimization strategies. Consequently, the TCJA is likely to affect 
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the valuations of U.S. domestic corporations more favorably relative to U.S. MNC’s. The first 
secondary hypothesis of this paper is the following: 
H2: In acquisition deals following the implementation of the TCJA, U.S. target firms without 
international activity experienced an increase in valuations relative to U.S. target firms with 
international activity (MNCs). 
3.2.2 Manufacturers vs. service providers 
The valuations of U.S. target firms might be affected differentially across sectors. For instance, 
prior studies find that corporate tax rates are positively correlated with capital investments in 
machinery and equipment in the manufacturing sector but not with similar investments in the 
services sector (Djankov et al., 2010). Assuming these investments in machinery and 
equipment have a positive NPV, one would expect that the corporate tax reduction 
asymmetrically benefited the manufacturers.  
Furthermore, as manufacturing firms are more asset-heavy than services firms, manufacturers 
are expected to reap most of the benefits of the new 100% first-year bonus depreciation. Due 
to the new bonus depreciation, the capital recovery provisions are considered more generous 
in the United States than in many other countries (TPC, 2020). This could further attract 
investments in the U.S., especially in the manufacturing sector. Ohrn (2019) looks at the 
relationship between state accelerated depreciation policies and investments in the 
manufacturing sector and finds that such policies have large effects on investment in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. Consequently, the TCJA is likely to affect the valuations of U.S. 
manufacturers more favorably relative to U.S. service providers. The next secondary 
hypothesis of this paper is the following: 
H3: In acquisition deals following the implementation of the TCJA, U.S. target firms 
in the manufacturing sector experienced an increase in valuations relative to U.S. 
target firms in the services sector. 
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3.2.3 High- vs. low-value firms 
Our final heterogeneity test builds on a previous empirical study by Wagner et al. (2020) that 
analyzes the effects of the TCJA on the ETRs (effective tax rates) of U.S. firms. When 
estimating the changes in taxes dependent on firms’ market value of equity, they find that more 
valuable firms experienced a larger decrease in ETRs relative to less valuable firms. If these 
results hold in our study, we should find an increase in the valuations of high-value U.S. target 
firms relative to low-value U.S. target firms.  
A possible explanation for this finding is that high-value firms usually have a broader set of 
activities than low-value firms. With the help of lawyers, accountants, and other experienced 
staff, this enables them to organize these activities in ways that achieve optimal tax savings, 
such as delaying or expediting investments and adjusting leverage. This advantage is further 
enhanced by the ever-increasing complexity of the U.S. tax system (TPC, 2020). The TCJA 
aims to balance competing goals such as fairness, enforceability, and subsidies for certain 
activities, resulting in additional complexity. This puts corporations with vast amounts of 
recourses at a competitive advantage in the search for tax strategies and potential loopholes 
that could reduce their ETRs. Consequently, the final secondary hypothesis of this paper is the 
following: 
H4: In acquisition deals following the implementation of the TCJA, high-value U.S. target 
firms experienced an increase in valuations relative to low-value U.S. target firms. 
3.3 Prior literature on the TCJA’s effects on U.S. 
corporations 
The literature on the empirical effects of the TCJA is somewhat limited due to its recent 
passage. Our thesis contributes to a growing field of empirical studies that examine how the 
markets reacted to the corporate tax overhaul in the TCJA. Existing studies typically look at 
either stock market valuations or the level of corporate investments, while our thesis 
investigates the impact on target valuations in acquisition deals. 
Generally, the first indications of investors’ expectations will be found in the stock markets. 
Early evidence from 2017 shows significantly positive returns in the U.S. stock market 
following key dates in the passage of the TCJA (Gaertner et al., 2019). Wagner et al. (2018) 
present evidence that shares of companies that had high tax liabilities in the years prior to the 
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TCJA experienced significant abnormal returns in the period immediately following the 2016 
election, implying that the market expected future tax cuts long before the TCJA went into 
effect. Edwards and Hutchens (2020) show similar results when studying the effects of the 
TCJA on IPO pricing and find an increase in offer prices after the TCJA.  
Studies focusing on the period after the TCJA confirm that the passage of the reform had a 
positive impact on the valuations of listed firms, but that most of the effect first became priced 
in when the firms released their financial statements in early 2018 (Wagner et al., 2020). Chen 
and Koester (2020) find similar results by showing that analysts failed to incorporate the 
majority of the deferred tax adjustments of the TCJA in late 2017. These findings suggest that 
although the markets reacted to news about the Act, they found it difficult to estimate the full 
effects of the TCJA during the legislative process. Thus, most of the impact on valuations in 
the stock markets was seen after the reform came into force on January 1st, 2018.  
Our study contributes to the literature on market pricing in response to the TCJA. First, we 
complement this research by investigating whether the valuation increase found in the stock 
markets are transferrable to acquisition deals. Second, we analyze whether the timing of the 
effect differs from the stock market by studying if news about the reform during the legislative 
period had an impact on the valuations of U.S. targets in acquisitions.  
While stock prices respond to new information immediately, it typically takes a considerable 
amount of time to complete an acquisition. Since the data required for studying how the TCJA 
affects acquisitions takes longer to be publicly available, we are only recently seeing empirical 
studies on this subject. There are, however, some interesting findings in the literature already. 
Atwood et al. (2020) study the effect of the reform on U.S. MNCs' domestic acquisition activity 
and find that MNCs that had previously paid repatriation taxes were more likely to make a 
domestic acquisition announcement following the TCJA. Amberger and Robinson (2020) 
study foreign investments of U.S. MNCs and find a decrease in foreign investment after the 
TCJA. Both of these studies relate to ours; while they study the investment activities of U.S. 
firms by analyzing transaction volume, our study complements these papers by looking at the 
transaction value of deals involving U.S. targets. Thus, we contribute to the literature on how 
the TCJA affected acquisition deals.  
In a broader sense, we also provide additional insight into how the corporate tax changes 
influenced the behavior of U.S. firms in general. As previously discussed, there are many ways 
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for corporations to spend additional cash deriving from tax cuts. Consistent with research from 
prior reforms (Blouin & Krull, 2009; Dharmapala et al., 2011; Graham et al., 2010), recent 
studies on the TCJA suggest that the reform has led companies to decrease their domestic debt 
(Bennett et al., 2019; Carrizosa et al., 2019), increase corporate payouts (Kalcheva et al., 2020), 
and increase capital investments (Hanlon et al., 2019). Our study then contributes to the 
growing literature on how the TCJA led to changes in the U.S. corporate landscape by 
influencing firms' behavior.  
Lastly, we present evidence that the valuation effects of the TCJA were heterogeneous across 
different firms. Previous studies have found that the tax reductions for U.S. firms stemming 
from the TCJA varied significantly across various characteristics (Amberger & Robinson, 
2020; Bennett et al., 2019; Dyreng et al., 2020; Hanlon et al., 2019; Kalcheva et al., 2020; 
Wagner et al., 2020). We add to these findings by researching whether the heterogenous tax 
reductions led to differences in the valuation effect for targets when controlling for industry, 
deal total target value, and international activities.  
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4. Empirical Setup, Data, Sample Selection, and 
Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Empirical setup 
Our study aims to estimate the causal effect of the TCJA (treatment) on the valuations of U.S. 
firms. To achieve this, we combine a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) model with a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) regression to estimate the Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (ATT) (Lechner, 2010). This method is well suited to estimate the effects of sharp 
changes in the economic environment or government policy (Angrist & Krueger, 1998), both 
of which are the case with the TCJA. When estimating the causal effect of a treatment like the 
TCJA, we face the problem often referred to as the problem of the missing counterfactual. 
Since all U.S. firms’ tax treatments were affected by the TCJA, we do not know what would 
have been their valuation in an acquisition in the absence of the treatment.  
We also encounter both the main types of self-selection bias of concern in DiD studies (Stuart 
et al., 2014). There is bias across groups since U.S. target firms (treated) are likely to be 
inherently different than foreign firms (controls) due to differences in, e.g., the business- and 
legal environment. In addition, there is bias across time since the composition of our sample 
firms changes pre- and post-TCJA due to different firms being acquired in each period.  
Consequently, an additional complexity of not having a suitable control group is encountered 
in our analysis. If our analysis does not consider that firm-specific characteristics affect the 
chance of receiving treatment, it could yield a biased ATT due to confounding variables 
(Becker & Ichino, 2002). Thus, we risk assigning effects to the TCJA that could be a 
consequence of other factors. We eliminate these problems by using PSM introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).  
4.1.1 ATT and the problem of the missing counterfactual 
We use the EBITDA multiple of the target as a valuation metric, which is discussed in section 
4.2.2. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we can denote the individual treatment effect 
of the TCJA on the EBITDA multiple paid by the acquirer for each acquisition target i as: 
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 ∆𝑖= 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖
𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴
− 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑖
𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑇𝐶𝐽𝐴
 (1) 
 
Any potential difference in the outcome can then be credited to the TCJA, and this parameter 
is commonly called the average treatment effect (ATE): 
 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = 𝐸(𝑟1) − 𝐸(𝑟2) (2) 
 
However, as only one of the outcomes in equation (1) can be observed for the same firm at the 
same time, we face the problem of not being able to estimate this effect. While experimental 
studies typically overcome this by introducing an intervention to a randomly selected treatment 
group and then comparing the outcome with a randomly selected control group (Szücs, 2014), 
we cannot follow a similar strategy since the participation in the treated group is decided by 
the target location.  
The ATE calculates the difference in outcome conditional on participation in the treatment and 
constitutes the expected effect on any individual in the population that was randomly assigned 
to the treatment. An issue with the ATE is that it includes the effect of the treatment on 
individuals the treatment was never intended for in the first place (Heckman, 1997). Since the 
TCJA is an alteration of the U.S. tax code and thereby tailored to affect U.S. firms, it is less 
relevant to determine the effect it would have had on foreign firms. To isolate the valuation 
effect of the TCJA on U.S. firms specifically, we instead use the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) in our analysis. The ATT is given by 
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸[𝑌𝑖1 − 𝑌𝑖0|𝐷𝑖 = 1] (3) 
where D = [0,1] is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation is treated, i.e., the target 
is located in the U.S.  
4.1.2 Propensity Score 
To solve the problem of self-selection in non-experimental studies, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) suggest using what they introduced as balancing scores b(x). This is a function of 
observable covariates x such that the conditional distribution of x given b(x) is the same for the 
treated and control group. An example of such a balancing score is the propensity score, which 




 𝑝(𝑋) ≡ Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) = 𝐸(𝐷|𝑋) (4) 
where D = [0,1] is the treatment indicator and X are the relevant pre-treatment characteristics.  
Matching treated observations with controls based on this propensity score is commonly 
referred to as Propensity Score Matching (PSM). The goal of PSM is to achieve balance in the 
distribution of the covariates between the treated and control group and thus attempt to simulate 
a randomly selected experiment. Since the U.S. firms exposed to the treatment are likely to 
vary systematically from foreign firms, we need to create a control group where the decision 
to be affected by the TCJA is both random and not driven by these differences. If we are 
successful in doing this, we eliminate the self-selection bias in addition to constructing an 
appropriate control group on which the ATT can be estimated.  
Hence, PSM controls for confounding variables and reduces potential bias in the outcome since 
the treated and control observations are similar with regard to the characteristics on which the 
propensity score was calculated. This comparable sample of foreign firms can then be used to 
evaluate what effect the TCJA had on the valuations of U.S. firms. 
4.1.3 The probability of a target’s tax treatment to be affected by 
the TCJA  
The first step in PSM is to estimate a logistic regression predicting whether a given target’s tax 
treatment is affected by the TCJA. Our dependent variable, Treatment, is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the target’s tax treatment was affected by the TCJA, i.e., a U.S. target firm, and 
zero for all possible control firms, i.e., a foreign target firm. We model the determinants of a 
target i being treated at the acquisition announcement date t using the following covariates: 
𝑃𝑅(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑁(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽3𝐿𝑁(𝑆𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙_𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ_𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑇𝑎𝑟_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽11𝐴𝑐𝑞_𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(5) 
 
When constructing a propensity score matching model, it is important to be conscious of which 
covariates to include or exclude. As discussed by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), only variables 
that simultaneously influence the participation decision and the outcome variable should be 
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included. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) add that propensity scores should only be calculated with 
the characteristics considered important to the analysis. In line with this, we only include 
variables that are believed to influence both whether or not a target’s firm tax treatment is 
affected by the TCJA and the EBITDA multiple paid by the acquirer in an acquisition. A 
complete description of the covariates included in the PSM is found in Appendix A. 
We include covariates for the target’s size in our matching regression, covering revenue 
(Revenue), total assets (Assets), and shareholders’ funds (Sfunds), as larger firms are more 
likely to be located in the U.S. and hence be affected by the TCJA. Naturally, the financial 
aspects of a target company also influence the EBITDA multiple paid by the acquirer.  
We include a covariate for the target firm age (Firm_Age), which is the number of years 
between the acquisition announcement year and the target’s year of incorporation. In line with 
research done by Loderer et al. (2011), established firms tend to be valued at a discount due to 
their lower growth prospects relative to younger and more innovative firms.  
Equation (5) also includes an indicator variable equal to one if the target firm is a publicly 
listed company (Listed) at the acquisition announcement date, and similarly an indicator 
variable for if the target firm is a multinational corporation (MNC). Our analysis includes these 
variables since U.S. firms are more likely to be listed or multinational relative to foreign firms. 
Hence, it affects the likelihood of a given target to be affected by the TCJA.   
The propensity score model also takes into account the year of the acquisition (Deal_Year), in 
addition to the industry of the target (Tar_Ind) and acquirer (Acq_Ind). We include these 
covariates as we want to account for fluctuations in the economy in addition to industry-
specific developments that influence both the willingness and ability to engage in an 
acquisition. These effects vary significantly across different industries and years, and ignoring 
this could cause bias in our results. Moreover, since the industry composition varies across 
different countries, the industries of the parties involved in acquisitions should be included in 
calculating the propensity score as it affects the likelihood of being a U.S. firm affected by the 
TCJA.  
Furthermore, in line with research by Lie and Lie (2002), we include an indicator variable 
(High_Earning) equal to one if the target company has an EBITDA scaled by assets above 0.15 
and hence is categorized as high earning. Lastly, we include the total target value 
(Target_Value), which ensures that target firms are matched as closely as possible in terms of 
their valuation.  
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4.1.4 Propensity Score Matching: Choice of matching method  
After estimating the likelihood of each target’s tax treatment to be affected by the TCJA given 
its pretreatment characteristics, the next step is the choice of matching method. There are many 
different propensity score matching techniques, and some of the most common are 
Stratification Matching, Radius Matching, Nearest-Neighbor Matching, and Kernel Matching. 
Each method has trade-offs between the quality and quantity of the matches, but none of them 
is considered superior to others (Becker & Ichino, 2002).  
In our baseline analysis, we match each treatment firm to a control firm based on the propensity 
scores from equation (5) using a one-to-one nearest-neighbor (NN) matching algorithm with a 
caliper of 1% with replacement. The NN matching algorithm is frequently used and quite 
intuitive. Each U.S. target firm is matched with exactly one foreign target firm based on the 
propensity score, thus yielding a pair of firms that are most similar based on the matching 
covariates. One of the main advantages of NN matching is that each of the treated observations 
is assigned a match, given that a control observation is available inside of the defined caliper. 
This is especially important in our study to obtain an adequate sample size, as the post-TCJA 
treated group is limited due to the tax reform's recent passage. Since the controls in our study 
can be chosen more than once (matching with replacement), the control group can be smaller 
than the treated group.  
4.1.5 Difference-in-differences regression framework 
After creating the relevant control groups, the final step of our analysis is combining the PSM 
with a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression. While the standard difference-in-differences 
method uses longitudinal data to compare two groups across two time periods, we have 
repeated cross-sectional data since the firms (both treated and control) included in our analysis 
prior to the TCJA will be different than those included post the TCJA. As a result, we 
essentially have four groups that consist of different observations.  
We combine the PSM matched sample before and after the TCJA and estimate the following 
OLS regression for deal i at acquisition announcement date t: 
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𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖
+  𝛽4𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒_𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐_𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑃𝐸_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑃𝐸_𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
(6) 
 
A detailed description of the covariates included in the DiD is found in Appendix B. The 
dependent variable is the EBITDA multiple of the target in the deal (EBITDA multiple). Post 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the deal is completed or announced after the TCJA and 
captures the time trend, i.e., aggregate factors that would cause changes in the EBITDA 
multiple over time even in the absence of the TCJA. Treatment is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the target location is the U.S. and captures any inherent difference between the 
treatment and control groups prior to the TCJA. By interacting these two variables, we obtain 
the interaction variable (Post * Treatment), which is the DiD-estimate that captures the ATT. 
Thus, our coefficient of interest is 𝛽3 which can be interpreted as the average causal effect of 
the TCJA on the EBITDA multiple paid by acquirers of U.S. targets. The difference-in-
differences estimate can be denoted as 
 𝛽3 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇,1 − 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑇,0) − (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴?̅?,1 − 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴?̅?,0) (7) 
where T is treatment status (T = U.S. targets and ?̅? = foreign targets), period 0 is pre-TCJA, 
and period 1 is post-TCJA. 
We include deal-specific covariates, such as payment method and deal-type, in our DiD-model 
to control for the impact of these characteristics on target valuations. In addition, we include 
industry fixed effects for both the target and acquirer in our regression using factor variables. 
In line with our main hypothesis, we expect a positive coefficient on 𝛽3 if the U.S. tax 
environment in fact became more favorable following the TCJA.  
4.2 Data and Sample selection 
4.2.1 Data 
The dataset used in this study is gathered from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database, which 
contains comprehensive information on worldwide M&A deals, including descriptive 
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information about the deal itself, pre-deal value multiples, and information on both the acquirer 
and target. 
We identify all acquisitions announced globally between January 1st, 2010, and December 31st, 
2019, where the acquirer gains a majority stake in the target due to the deal. Consistent with 
prior research (Hanlon et al., 2015; Harford, 1999), we use the deal announcement date to 
determine the time at which the deal was agreed upon. We set the starting point of our analysis 
in 2010 and the ending point to 2019 to lessen any potential impact of the financial crisis and 
COVID-19 pandemic, respectively. Next, we link all targets in our sample to the Orbis 
company database using the identifiers provided by Bureau van Dijk. This allows us to retrieve 
their date of incorporation, listing status, and main countries of any foreign operations.  
4.2.2 Valuation methods of firms 
To test our hypotheses, we need a valuation metric that is both publicly available and reliable. 
There are multiple valuation techniques available, and two methods in particular are commonly 
used by investors when evaluating a potential investment. Each method differs in terms of 
assumptions and the data needed to perform the valuation.  
The first method is the discounted cash flow (DCF) method, which is considered to be the most 
important valuation technique in M&As (Marren, 1993). Simply put, the method estimates 
future cash flows and discounts them with an applicable discount rate to come up with a proper 
valuation estimate of the target firm. The approach is highly dependent on the acquiring firm’s 
choice of discount rate and assumptions about future profits, growth opportunities, and 
synergies between the two companies (Mukherjee et al., 2003). Thus, the DCF valuation results 
from a thorough analysis by the acquirer, and these estimations are seldom publicly available. 
Due to this, the method is not useful in our study when analyzing aggregate acquisition data.  
The second method is the use of market multiples, which are ratios calculated using a 
combination of market values and items on the financial statement of the company of interest. 
Thus, multiples have an advantage compared to the DCF method because it is a single metric 
calculated on financial statement data often publicly available. A common multiple is the 
Enterprise-Value-to-EBITDA multiple. Many studies have looked at the accuracy of the 
EBITDA multiple when performing valuations. Baker and Ruback (1999) discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of using multiples compared to DCF in valuations and state that 
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multiples are superior if firms are comparable and if the multiple can be estimated reliably. Lie 
and Lie (2002) study the accuracy of the EBITDA multiple and other market multiples by 
comparing their estimates to market valuations of listed firms. They find that the EBITDA 
multiple performs well across a large sample of medium to high earning firms.   
We use the EBITDA multiple as a valuation metric in our study since it is likely to provide 
accurate valuation estimations on aggregate acquisition data matched on firm characteristics.  
4.2.3 Sample selection 
A detailed breakdown of the sample selection process is outlined in Table 2 on the following 




The Zephyr database contains information on completed, pending, withdrawn, announced, and 
rumored deals. Naturally, all completed deals are of interest, but we also include deals that are 
yet to be completed (announced) as it can take up to several years for a corporate acquisition 
to be completed and the companies to be legally combined into a single entity. These deals 
contain valuable information on the effects of the TCJA, and excluding them from our sample 
could result in valuable information being missed. In addition to completed and announced 
deals, we also include a subcategory of pending deals. Specifically, we include deals that are 
Table 2: Sample selection – Baseline model   
This table shows the sample selection process for the baseline model. We obtain the initial acquisition data sample from 
Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database. The final sample consists of 4,046 acquisitions announced between 2010 and 2019, 
which is used to calculate the propensity scores for both the U.S. and foreign target firms.  
 
 No. of obs. 
dropped  
No. of obs. 
remaining 
Initial sample of global acquisitions available in Zephyr on October 5th, 2020  751,647 
Less:  Acquisitions outside of period of interest (01.01.2010 – 31.12.2019) 403,367 348,280 
Less:  Acquisitions with missing deal value  236,943 111,337 
Less:   Acquisitions with missing values on the target’s revenue, assets, shareholder funds 
 or EBITDA 
96,958 14,379 
Less:  Non-takeover acquisitions (defined as a deal where the acquirer already had an 
 initial stake in the target above 50% or a final stake below 50% after the deal) 
3,908 10,471 
Less:  Acquisitions of a target company located in a country with a non-advanced 
 economy as classified by IMF 
2,681 7,790 
Less:  Acquisitions of targets classified as a start-up (up to and including three years old) 
 or with missing date of incorporation 
1,954 5,836 
Less:  Acquisitions of targets with low (<= 0.05) EBITDA scaled on assets 1,238 4,598 
Less:  Acquisitions with a deal status other than (1) Announced, (2), Completed, (3) 
 Completed Assumed, or (4) Pending - awaiting regulatory approval 
301 4,297 
Less:  Acquisitions of targets with shareholder funds below $250,000 or total assets 
 below $500,000 
146 4,151 
Less:  Duplicated acquisitions 47 4,104 
Less:  Acquisitions with missing acquirer or target industry 18 4,086 
Less:  Acquisitions with the 1% highest EBITDA multiples 40 4,046 
Unmatched sample  4,046 
 # U.S. targets before the TCJA  654 
 # U.S. targets after the TCJA  128 
 # Foreign targets before the TCJA  2,415 
 # Foreign targets after the TCJA  849 
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awaiting regulatory approval since these deals are agreed upon by the involved parties and, 
therefore, likely reflect the targets' true market value. We drop all deals for which pre-deal 
value multiples on revenue, assets, shareholders’ funds, or EBITDA are missing, in addition to 
any deals with unknown deal value.  
Since all deals with a foreign target are part of the control group, and all deals with a U.S. target 
are part of the treated group, we risk our results being biased since we do not properly account 
for country-specific factors. This could be especially problematic if some countries have a 
business- or legal environment that severely differs from the U.S. and thus influences these 
firms' valuations. An example of this could be differences in the level of corruption. Studies 
show high levels of corruption greatly increase the risk of investments and affect the 
willingness to pay for companies located in such countries (Olken & Pande, 2012). To limit 
any potential omitted-variable bias caused by differences in the target location, we reduce our 
control group to only include countries with similar political, legal, and economic traits as the 
U.S. We use a list of advanced economies provided by the International Monetary Fund (2020) 
and exclude all deals where the target location differs from these countries. The countries 
included in our sample and their key characteristics, both matched and unmatched, are attached 
in Appendix C.  
Prior research has shown that the EBITDA multiple is very low performing when valuing firms 
with an EBITDA scaled on assets less than 0.05 (Lie & Lie, 2002). Since the EBITDA multiple 
is not suited to provide an accurate estimate of the valuations of these low earning firms, we 
exclude them from our analysis. The multiple also struggles to provide an accurate valuation 
estimate of start-up firms, as issues with asymmetrical information lead investors to rely on 
other non-traditional valuation techniques. For instance, venture capitalists often emphasize 
the qualities of the entrepreneur rather than the firm itself when evaluating a potential 
investment in a start-up (Festel et al., 2013). We use a general rule that defines companies as 
start-ups if they are three years or younger (Cockayne, 2019) at the deal announcement date 
and exclude all observations with target firms classified as start-ups from our analysis.  
Following Amberger and Robinson (2020), we exclude observations with target shareholder 
funds below $250,000 or total assets below $500,000. Furthermore, as discussed by Eberhart 
(2004), one of the main problems with the use of multiples when valuing firms is that their 
distribution is positively skewed. This is due to the multiples having a lower boundary of zero 
but no upper limit. To lessen the effect of this skewness, we emit the top 1% EBITDA 
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multiples6. By doing so, we prevent our analysis from being driven by a few observations with 
abnormally large EBITDA multiples.   
We are left with 4,046 deals (782 U.S. targets and 3,264 foreign targets). This is used to 
calculate the propensity scores for both the treated and untreated firms, which then serves as 
the basis for the matching algorithm that selects the control group. As the control group is more 
than four times larger than the set of U.S. targets and our matching is done with replacement 
and a caliper of 1%, an adequately close match is likely to be found for each U.S. target.  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Appendix D (Panel A and B) presents descriptive statistics for the unmatched data in the pre- 
and post-TCJA period for both U.S. and foreign firms. It shows that we indeed face self-
selection bias since the average U.S. firm differs significantly from the average foreign firm. 
This difference in means is confirmed by strongly significant t-statistics on nearly all 
characteristics in both periods. This fundamental difference between U.S. and foreign firms 
illustrates why Propensity Score Matching is needed to balance the two groups to obtain non-
biased effect estimates.  
Because of these differences, the likelihood of a target receiving treatment is not random since 
the average value of a U.S. target in our sample is more than ten times larger than the average 
foreign target, in addition to U.S. targets being more established with more assets, higher 
revenue, and higher shareholder funds. The average U.S. target is also more likely to be an 
MNC in addition to being publicly listed, while the average foreign target firm has a higher 
EBITDA scaled on assets. The matching procedure's goal is to reduce these differences and 
achieve covariate balance amongst the observed pre-treatment characteristics included in the 
analysis.  
 
6 This constitutes 40 deals with an average EBITDA multiple of 353.9 and a maximum of 2597.3. Some of these outliers are 
assumed to be misrepresented in the Zephyr database. One such example is a deal from November 23rd, 2016 where L-3 
acquired MacDonald Humfrey (Automation) Ltd. The EBITDA multiple reported by Zephyr is 998.23, although the purchase 
price represents an EBITDA multiple of about 10 considering the business' estimated earnings according to Nasdaq (Zacks, 
2016). 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Matching results 
Appendix D (Panel C and D) presents descriptive statistics for the matched data in the pre- and 
post-TCJA period for both U.S. and foreign firms. If the PSM model successfully balances the 
samples, the t-statistics should be non-significant at the conventional 5% level, indicating that 
a difference in the means of the characteristics is no longer present. The results show that the 
PSM model was indeed successful in achieving covariate balance across all characteristics. 
Figure 1 below displays the reduction in bias graphically. While there is still some bias present, 
the overall reduction in bias is significant.  
Figure 1: Covariate balances in the unmatched and matched samples 
This figure illustrates the balancing of the covariates included the Propensity Score Matching in the unmatched and matched sample. See 
Appendix A for covariate descriptions. As evident, there is significant standardized bias in the unmatched samples in both periods. The 
standardized bias is the percentage difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples as a percentage of the square 
root of the average of the sample variances (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). This bias is significantly reduced across most covariates due to 
the matching, indicating that our matching is successful in obtaining non-biased covariates.  
 
Due to the 1% caliper in the NN matching, the treated group consists of fewer observations 
after the matching due to observations off common support being dropped. See Figure 2 on the 
following page for a definition of common support. This results in the pre-TCJA treated sample 
being reduced from 654 to 633 observations, and the post-TCJA treated sample being reduced 
from 128 to 80 observations. Thus, the treated group consists of 713 observations, which will 
be matched with 713 control observations, yielding a matched sample size of 1,426. While the 
caliper reduces the sample size and gives more weight to fewer observations, it improves the 
matching quality as only treated observations that find a control observation with a maximum 
deviation in the propensity score of 1% are included in the analysis.  
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Figure 2: Common support – Propensity Score Matching 
This figure illustrates the propensity score distribution for the treated and control group before matching (4,046 observations). A risk of NN 
matching is bad matches if the closest neighbor is far away. This risk factor is largely eliminated by imposing a caliper that only includes a 
treatment observation if a sufficiently close control observation is found. As evident from the below figure, the propensity scores of the 
treated observations are fairly spread out while the control observations are particularly dense in the lower end (indicating non-similar firm 
characteristics to the average U.S. firm). We include a caliper of 1%, which results in a total of 69 observations (~9% of the treated sample 
of 782) being excluded from the analysis due to being off common support. Most of these excluded observations are in the upper tail of the 










5.2 Main hypothesis: the TCJA increased the valuations of 
U.S. target firms 
Table 3 on the following page presents the main results of the analysis described in section 3. 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction term (Post*Treatment), which shows the estimated 
ATT; the change in target valuations due to the TCJA. Column (1) presents the results of 
equation (6) and shows a positive coefficient of the interaction term of 5.168, which is 
significant at the 5% level. According to these estimates, the TCJA increased the EBITDA 
multiple of U.S. targets by 32% on average (see Figure 3) and thus supports H1. Furthermore, 
the constant is also statistically significant at the 5% level, strengthening the impression that 
the model fits the data well.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of Treatment is significant at the 10% level with a negative value 
of 1.632. This provides evidence that U.S. firms were systematically undervalued relative to 
their foreign competitors prior to the TCJA, possibly due to an uncompetitive tax system. 
Overall, the estimates in column (1) support H1 while implying that the TCJA indeed induced 
a valuation premium on U.S. firms relative to similar foreign firms. 
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t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
 
7 A total of 40 outliers are excluded in column (1) through (3), of which only three are in the treated sample (U.S.). None of 
these three outliers are on common support and thus are not included in the matched sample. Because of this, the number of 
observations does not increase in column (4) although outliers are included.  
Table 3: Main results – Baseline model 
Below are the results from the DiD regressions of the main model. Column (1) shows the results from the NN matching model described 
in section 4. In column (2), deal characteristics are excluded to examine the effect of this. Column (3) shows the results of the main 
model when replacement is not allowed in the NN matching. Column (4) shows the results when the complete dataset (including outliers) 
is used for the estimations. Lastly, column (5) shows the regression when all deals in the period between the 2016 election (09.11.2016) 
and the TCJA coming into effect (01.01.2018) are excluded. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Post -2.725 -2.957* -0.705 -2.923 -2.177 
 (-1.51) (-1.65) (-0.36) (-0.97) (-1.19) 
Treatment -1.632* -2.240*** -0.067 -1.992 -1.818* 
 (-1.78) (-2.66) (-0.06) (-1.31) (-1.85) 
Post*Treatment 5.168** 5.413** 1.773 5.571 5.047** 
 (2.07) (2.19) (0.65) (1.34) (1.99) 
Hostile takeover -5.427***  -3.767 -6.535** -6.861*** 
 (-2.84)  (-1.42) (-2.06) (-3.12) 
All-cash deal -0.747  -0.224 1.650 -1.124 
 (-0.84)  (-0.23) (1.15) (-1.19) 
All-shares deal -2.861  -1.267 -4.765 -4.042** 
 (-1.58)  (-0.52) (-1.52) (-2.10) 
Public takeover -2.979*  -3.986** -1.724 -2.857* 
 (-1.87)  (-2.15) (-0.65) (-1.72) 
Recommended offer 1.805  0.910 -1.556 1.536 
 (1.22)  (0.53) (-0.64) (0.99) 
Private Equity seller 3.224***  3.498*** 3.682* 2.842** 
 (2.73)  (2.78) (1.91) (2.27) 
Private Equity buyer -1.329  -0.322 -1.722 -1.780 
 (-0.60)  (-0.14) (-0.44) (-0.72) 
Constant 20.31** 19.96** 19.17** 11.41 20.63* 
 (2.05) (2.01) (2.03) (0.60) (1.80) 
Including outliers? No  No No Yes No 
Matching with replacement? Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Including post-election period? Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 1426 1426 904 14267 1313 
R2 0.210 0.194 0.161 0.098 0.207 
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Given that the average EBITDA multiple of the 500 largest U.S. companies prior to the TCJA 
averaged from 12 to 15 (Siblis Research, 2020), an average U.S. EBITDA multiple of 18.678 
pre-TCJA seems somewhat high. There are, however, large variations between industries. The 
average EBITDA multiple in the IT & Software industries in the U.S. have been 18-25 in the 
last years (Statista, 2020). As evident from Appendix F, our matched sample contains a large 
share of companies in these industries. Thus, the EBITDA multiple is inside of a reasonable 
range of what would be expected given our sample. 
Although most deal-specific controls are not statistically significant, their coefficients can still 
be interpreted and provide insight into the model's overall credibility. As evident, firms 
acquired by Private Equity buyers are cheaper, while firms sold by Private Equity sellers are 
statistically more expensive on average. These effects are as expected since the private equity 
business model depends on improving the target firm's operating financials before exiting the 
position at an inflated market valuation. Our findings also suggest that firms acquired in a 
hostile takeover (such as a leveraged buy-out or with a bid not favored by management) are 
significantly cheaper, which is reasonable given that hostile bids are presented directly to the 
target firm's shareholders, who may be more prone than the management to focus on short-
term profit rather than the long-term valuation and growth prospects of the target firm. The 
same explanation can be applied to the effect seen with public takeovers. Lastly, deals 
involving bids favored by management (Recommended offer) are more expensive on average, 
possibly representing bids in which the management recommends the shareholders to accept 
because it contains a sufficiently high deal premium. 
Figure 3: Difference-in-differences estimates of the EBITDA multiple 
EBITDA 
multiple 
𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0 
(Pre-TCJA) 
𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 1 
(Post-TCJA) 
Difference 
(𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡|1 − 𝐷𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡|0) 
𝐷?̅? = 0 
(Control) 
𝛽0 
= 20.31 (2.05) 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 
= 20.31 − 2.725 
= 17.585 
17.585 − 20.31 
= - 2.725 (-1.51) 
𝐷𝑇 = 1 
(Treatment) 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽2 
= 20.31 − 1.632 
 = 18.678 
 
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3 
= 20.31 − 2.725
− 1.632 + 5.168 
= 21.121 
21.121 − 18.678 
= 2.443 
Difference 
(𝐷𝑇 − 𝐷?̅?) 
18.68 − 20.31 
= - 1.632 (-1.78) 
21.12 − 17.59 
= 3.536 
𝛽3 
= 5.168 (2.07) 
The graph below illustrates the EBITDA multiple of U.S. firms (black line) and foreign firms (red line) before and after the TCJA. Under 
the assumption that the treated observations (U.S. firms) would have experienced the same average change in the outcome variable (EBITDA 
multiple) as the non-treated observations (foreign firms) over time in the absence of the treatment (TCJA), the EBITDA multiple of U.S. 
firms would have declined from 18.678 to 15.952 (black dashed line). Instead, the U.S. firms’ tax treatments were affected by the TCJA, 
which increased the EBITDA multiple by 5.168 (𝛽3) to 21.121. This constitutes an ATT of 32.4%, i.e., that the TCJA increased the average 
U.S. firm's value by 32.4%. T-statistics in parentheses.  
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In Column (2), we adjust our main model and exclude the deal characteristics to analyze the 
extent to which this affects the main findings presented above. The effects remain largely the 
same, and the interaction term remains significant at the 5% level with a slightly higher 
coefficient. Interestingly, Treatment now becomes significant at a 1% level with a negative 
coefficient of 2.240. This further supports the notion that U.S. firms were systematically 
undervalued prior to the TCJA. Overall, the inclusion of deal characteristics has little impact 
on our findings, and R-squared drops from 21% to 19.4%.  
One of the choices mentioned in section 3 is that we allow for replacement in the nearest 
neighbor PSM. In column (3), we estimate the model from column (1) without allowing for 
replacement in the matching. With these specifications, we no longer find any significant effect 
of the TCJA, although the coefficient is still positive. This is likely due to a lack of comparable 
foreign firms because of the inherent differences between U.S. and foreign firms (see Figure 
2). When matching with replacement, the foreign target firms with similar characteristics to the 
average U.S. firms are used multiple times as control observations. When this is not allowed, 
a sufficiently close match is not found, yielding many observations off common support and 
less power to the analysis, as evident from the drop in the number of observations and R-
squared. This confirms the need for matching with replacement in order to achieve an adequate 
sample size on common support, as our sample contains too few foreign target firms with 
similar characteristics as the average U.S. firm. 
In columns (1) through (3), the top 1% EBITDA multiples are emitted based on the reasoning 
given by Eberhart (2004) that the distribution of multiples is positively skewed. Column (4) 
presents the results of the same model as column (1) but including these outliers. While the 
estimated effect of the interaction term is still roughly the same, it is no longer statistically 
significant. The constant becomes significantly lower and non-significant, demonstrating one 
of the main problems with positively skewed data. This results in a few observations with 
arbitrarily high EBITDA multiples driving our results, making the linear DiD model a bad fit 
for the data. This is evident from looking at R-squared, which drops to 9.8%. These results 
support the decision to drop the outliers in our main model.  
In columns (1) through (4), we look at the two periods before and after January 1st, 2018, to 
estimate the effects of the TCJA. As previously discussed, research on market reactions has 
shown that the expectations of the TCJA increased firm valuations in the stock market 
(Gaertner et al., 2019; Wagner et al., 2018, 2020). While January 1st, 2018 was the date the tax 
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reform came into force, one can argue that since the Republicans took control over both the 
executive (President) and legislative (Congress) branches of government in the 2016 election, 
the expectations of a future tax reform could have had an effect on target valuations in the 
period between the 2016 election and the TCJA came into force. Because of this, we would 
expect a larger effect of the TCJA when excluding these observations from the pre-TCJA 
sample. To test this hypothesis, we re-estimate the model in column (1) while excluding all 
observations between November 9th, 2016 (the day after the election) and January 1st, 2018. 
The results of this estimation are presented in column (5) of Table 3. The effect of the TCJA 
remains significant at the 5% level with approximately the same coefficient. Given that the 
coefficient becomes slightly lower in this model, however, our results provide no evidence of 
an increase in target valuations in anticipation of a future tax reform similar to the one observed 
in public firm valuations (Gaertner et al., 2019; Wagner et al., 2018, 2020). This supports the 
findings of Chen and Koester (2020) that analysts failed to incorporate the vast majority of the 
deferred tax adjustments of the TCJA during the legislative process.  
5.2.1 Robustness of main findings  
There are three main concerns with our findings. First, the econometric model might not 
account for all confounding variables, which raises doubts as to whether the findings can be 
interpreted causally. It is also unclear if U.S. firms would have experienced the same decline 
in valuations as foreign firms in the absence of the TCJA. Second, there are data restrictions 
due to the recent passage of the TCJA in addition to questionable outliers in the Zephyr M&A 
database. Third, our findings may be sensitive to the choice of matching method.  
Causal inference 
In general, our results can be used for causal inference if the underlying assumptions of both 
PSM and DiD are met. While PSM helps with the fundamental problem of confounding effects 
due to the non-randomization of subjects to the treatment group, a critical underlying 
assumption is the assumption of no unobserved confounders8. While randomized experiments 
can stochastically balance all observed and unobserved covariates, PSM can only achieve 
balance in the observed covariates (Rubin, 2001). Therefore, this assumption is difficult to meet 
 
8 There are other underlying assumptions of PSM, but the assumption of no unobserved confounders is assumed to be the most 
critical. This assumption is referred to (Battistin & Chesher, 2014) as unconfoundedness (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), 
selection on observables (J. J. Heckman & Robb, 1985) or conditional independence assumption (Lechner, 1999). It can be 
written (Y1, Y0) ⊥ D|X, i.e. that when controlling for X observable covariates, the outcome is independent of treatment status 
since the assignment to treatment is random. If the assumption is met, an unbiased counterfactual for the treatment group can 
be constructed (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008).  
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as it states that all covariates that are potential confounders must be observed and included in 
the matching to adjust for them. If successful, the effects seen are then due to the treatment 
alone rather than other confounding factors, and the results can therefore be used for causal 
inference.  
While our PSM model in equation (5) includes a wide range of pre-treatment firm 
characteristics such as financials and industries, there are other potential confounders not 
included, such as the number of patents, number of employees, average wage, debt, and 
leverage ratios. These variables are not included due to the lack of available data. While there 
are data available on some of these variables in the Orbis and Zephyr databases, there are too 
many missing values to yield an adequate sample size for the PSM model. Thus, these 
covariates may not be balanced between the treatment and control group since they are not 
included in the analysis. This could affect the propensity scores, resulting in an analysis that 
effectively compares apples and oranges. Although the most influential pre-treatment firm 
characteristics for firm valuations are likely included in the PSM, it might not account for all 
confounding variables. Thus, it is not clear if our findings can be interpreted causally.   
Furthermore, the most important assumption in DiD is the assumption of parallel trends. It 
states that in the absence of the treatment, the treatment and control groups would have had the 
same trend in the outcome variable across time (Stuart et al., 2014). In other words, it assumes 
that the decline seen in the valuations of foreign firms reflects what would have happened with 
the valuations of U.S. firms in the absence of the TCJA. If this is true, the DiD method provides 
unbiased effect estimates that can be used for causal inference. When multiple pre-treatment 
periods exist, the assumption can be tested by looking for pre-treatment trends in the treatment 
and control groups. We cannot test the assumption since our analysis only has one pre-
treatment period (before the TCJA). Still, the pre-treatment trends are likely to be reasonably 
similar due to the matching and since only targets in advanced economies (IMF, 2020) are 
included in our analysis.  
Moreover, we hypothesized two main ways in which the TCJA could change the valuations of 
U.S. firms: the reduction in taxes and a change in firm behavior. While most of the valuation 
effect found in our study is likely to stem from the former, there could still be some bias from 
the latter effect present in our analysis. While this bias should be relatively small given the 
matching, our analysis is unlikely to only catch the effect of lower taxes due to unobserved 
covariates. Examples of unobserved covariates related to firm behavior include firms changing 
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their leverage or altering their number of employees due to the TCJA, both of which could 
affect their valuations. This might result in bias in our model since this change in valuation 
could be assigned to either the TCJA or other control variables while it was actually due to an 
unobserved change in firm behavior. 
Data restrictions 
The second concern with our findings is data restrictions, which are closely related to the first 
concern. Since the TCJA was recently passed, the sample of acquisitions with U.S. targets in 
the post-period with the required data is limited. Therefore, the effect of the TCJA is calculated 
on 80 firms that are not necessarily representative of the average U.S. firm, which could imply 
that our findings are not transferrable to the general population of U.S. firms. There are also 
questions to what extent our findings are driven by outliers in either tail. The effect of the TCJA 
becomes non-significant in Column (4) of Table 3 when outliers are included, indicating that 
our findings are sensitive to this. In addition, as evident from the outliers removed, there are 
possibly errors in the Zephyr database, which may further impact our findings.  
Sensitivity to matching method 
The third concern with our findings is the sensitivity to the matching method and procedure. 
The PSM estimators differ in three main ways: how the neighborhood of each treated 
observation is defined, how the common support problem is handled, and which weight is given 
to the neighbors (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). As evident from Column (3) of Table 3, when 
matching without replacement, the effect of the TCJA is no longer statistically significant when 
changing how we define common support. Changing how the neighborhood is defined (e.g., 
Kernel, Radius, or Stratification instead of Nearest Neighbor) could also affect the PSM 
estimators. While the NN matching with replacement and a caliper of 1% is a well-suited 
matching procedure given our data sample (see Appendix D or Figure 1), there are essentially 
unlimited ways of using PSM when altering the three parameters mentioned by Caliendo and 
Kopeinig. This is a common critique of PSM, which could cause researcher bias. Thus, a 
concern with our findings is that they are not necessarily constant across different adjustments 
to the PSM method and procedure.  
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5.3 Heterogeneity analyses  
To narrow down the effects of the TCJA, we do a variety of sample splits designed to detect 
differences in how valuations are impacted dependent on firm-specific factors. Unfortunately, 
the small size of our final sample limits the scope for additional heterogeneity analyses. Thus, 
we split the sample into large subgroups to have enough power to obtain significant results. 
We proceed with column (1) from Table 3 as this is the best-fitted model for our data given the 
explanatory power and perform heterogeneity analyses on this model. Table 4 on the following 
page presents the main results of these heterogeneity analyses.  
5.3.1 H2: Domestic target firms experienced an increase in 
valuations relative to U.S. MNCs 
To test H2, we re-estimate the main model while only including observations with domestic or 
multinational target firms. These analyses are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, 
respectively. For the domestic firms, the estimated effect of the TCJA remains significant at 
the 5% level, and the coefficient increases from 5.168 to 6.681. This constitutes an ATT of 
50%, implying that the valuation effect is concentrated among the domestic firms. This is 
supported by the results in column (3), where only MNCs are included. The interaction term's 
coefficient is 1.307 and no longer significant, suggesting that U.S. MNCs experienced a non-
significant valuation increase of 6% due to the TCJA.  
Combined, these results are in line with our expectations and imply that the domestic firms 
were the greater beneficiaries of the corporate tax cuts in the TCJA. This analysis supports H2 
and provides enough evidence to establish that the tax reduction mainly increased the 
valuations of U.S. domestic firms. Thus, our results support the findings of Dyreng et al. (2020) 
that the domestic firms benefited the most from the TCJA. 
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   t statistics in parentheses 
    * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
Table 4: Main results – Heterogeneity analyses   
Below are the results of the DiD regressions in our heterogeneity analyses. The results from our main model are included in column (1) for 
comparison. Columns (2) and (3) present the results when including only domestic firms and MNCs, respectively. MNCs are identified as 
companies with significant foreign operations, as reported by Orbis. Columns (4) and (5) show the results when running the DiD regression 
on firms classified as manufacturers or service providers using SIC major group (a two-digit SIC code equal to 39 or below are classified 
as manufacturers, while a two-digit SIC code of 40 and above are classified as service providers). In column (6) and (7), the sample is split 
using the median deal total target value (see Appendix A). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Main 
model 






Post -2.725 -3.932* 1.972 -0.829 -7.258*** -2.435 -4.629* 
 (-1.51) (-1.87) (0.47) (-0.32) (-2.85) (-1.10) (-1.68) 
Treatment -1.632* -3.440*** 0.984 -2.637* 0.228 0.717 -2.878** 
 (-1.78) (-3.06) (0.53) (-1.93) (0.18) (0.62) (-2.12) 
Post*Treatment 5.168** 6.681** 1.307 4.996 8.170** 5.385* 7.521** 
 (2.07) (2.34) (0.22) (1.42) (2.37) (1.77) (2.02) 
Hostile takeover -5.427*** -2.020 -7.655** -6.442** -4.395 -3.391 -7.134*** 
 (-2.84) (-0.81) (-2.37) (-2.48) (-1.56) (-1.32) (-2.74) 
All-cash deal -0.747 0.005 -0.236 -1.324 1.277 1.494 -0.552 
 (-0.84) (0.00) (-0.13) (-1.01) (1.05) (1.40) (-0.38) 
All-shares deal -2.861 -4.788** 2.221 -6.286** 2.633 -5.806* -0.361 
 (-1.58) (-2.42) (0.47) (-2.26) (1.10) (-1.86) (-0.16) 
Public takeover -2.979* -2.123 -10.40*** -1.912 -4.618* -4.250** -4.588** 

















































Constant 20.31** 20.61 19.95* 17.22*** 19.40** 31.75* 15.89 
 (2.05) (0.97) (1.78) (6.19) (2.22) (1.80) (1.39) 
Observations 1426 1036 390 761 665 714 712 
R2 0.210 0.248 0.352 0.270 0.243 0.192 0.432 
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5.3.2 H3: U.S. manufacturers experienced an increase in valuations 
relative to U.S. service providers 
Next, we test if there is a heterogeneous valuation effect between manufacturers and service 
providers. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 re-estimate the main model, including only service 
providers and manufacturers, respectively. For service providers, the effect of the TCJA is 
positive, with a coefficient of 4.996, suggesting a valuation increase of 36%. This effect, 
however, is non-significant even at the 10% level. Column (5) shows that the valuation effect 
of the TCJA is concentrated in the manufacturing sector with a positive coefficient of 8.170, 
suggesting a significant (at the 5% level) valuation increase of 66%. The overall fit of both 
models is good, as evident the higher explanatory power than the main model in column (1).  
The significant difference between the interaction terms' coefficients is sufficient to establish 
a heterogeneous valuation effect between service providers and manufacturers. Our study thus 
complements the research by Ohrn (2019) and Djankov et al. (2010) that the policy of bonus 
depreciation and a reduction in corporate tax rates have large effects on investments in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, making them more attractive in the eyes of acquirers. Our findings 
support H3. 
5.3.3 H4: High-value U.S. target firms experienced an increase in 
valuations relative to low-value U.S. target firms 
In the last heterogeneity test, we differentiate between high- and low-value targets by splitting 
the matched sample at the median of the deal total target value. In our data sample, the deal 
total target value (see Appendix A) equals the market value of equity used in the study by 
Wagner et al. (2020). Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 re-estimate the main model for low- and 
high-value targets, respectively.  
For low-value targets, the effect of the TCJA is 5.385 and significant at the 10% level. 
Similarly, the effect of the TCJA for high-value targets is 7.521 and significant at the 5% level. 
Even though this indicates that high-value targets benefitted slightly more from the TCJA than 
low-value targets, the difference between the interaction terms is minimal. Since there is a 
positive and significant (at the 10% level) valuation effect present in both groups, we do not 
find enough evidence to support H4. 
Even though the analysis cannot establish a significant valuation difference between high- and 
low-value targets, our findings still compliment the research by Wagner et al. (2020) by looking 
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at the TCJA’s impact on the valuations of high-and low-value firms rather than their effective 
tax rates only. This provides further evidence on the heterogeneous effects of the TCJA and 
indicates that the already valuable firms benefitted slightly more from the tax reform.  
5.3.4 Robustness of heterogeneity analyses  
The concerns of our main model are also present in the heterogeneity analyses. In addition to 
the same doubts about whether the findings can be interpreted causally and their sensitivity to 
the choice of matching method, the data restrictions become even stronger when splitting the 
sample further. Since the post-TCJA treated sample contains only 80 observations, splitting the 
sample into smaller samples will cause the findings to be driven by even fewer observations. 
The post-TCJA treated sample contains only 15 MNCs (65 domestic firms) and 34 
manufacturing firms (46 service providers), which raises further doubts as to whether the 
valuation effects of the TCJA on these firms are applicable to the general population of U.S. 
MNCs and manufacturers.  
Even though our findings suggest heterogeneous effects in all three heterogeneity analyses, 
these results should only be interpreted as indications since analyses on data samples of this 
size provide limited opportunity to interpret the results causally. In addition, when testing 
differences in coefficients (in this case, the interaction term) across different subsamples, there 
is not enough power to reject the test’s hypothesis9 based on data samples of this size. Further 
analyses on larger datasets are required to confirm these effects statistically.  
 
9 There are different statistical tests for testing the equality of coefficients from two different regressions. Following Clogg et 





. Another possibility is the Chow Test (Chow, 1960). Both 
of these tests yield non-significant p-values (>0.05) for all three heterogeneity analyses. However, because of the low power, 




Tax policy affects all participants in the economy. Changes in taxes influence the behavior of 
both corporations and individuals, and empirical research is key to understand the 
consequences of such policy changes. This type of research can help policymakers make more 
informed decisions on future alterations of the tax code.  Our paper contributes to a growing 
field of literature on the effects of the TCJA by studying target valuations in acquisition deals. 
The TCJA introduced large changes to the U.S. corporate tax system by reducing the federal 
statutory corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and moving from a worldwide to a partially 
territorial tax system. Our results show that the average U.S. target firm received a significant 
32% increase in its valuation following the reform while inducing a valuation premium on U.S. 
firms relative to similar foreign firms. This finding is in line with our expectations.  
While the reduction in the federal statutory corporate tax rate affects all U.S. firms, the TCJA 
included multiple key provisions that could cause heterogeneous effects between firms. We 
conducted several heterogeneity analyses to investigate which type of firms that benefitted the 
most from the TCJA. Our results provide evidence that the valuation effects were not evenly 
distributed between U.S. firms. The TCJA favored manufacturing firms, possibly due to the 
tax advantages of assets (Ohrn, 2019) and the reduction in the federal statutory corporate tax 
rate (Djankov et al., 2010). Consistent with prior research (Dyreng et al., 2020), we find that 
domestic firms benefitted more from the TCJA than MNCs, likely due to the new GILTI, FDII, 
and BEAT provisions. We also examined if there were heterogeneous effects depending on 
deal total target values. Although our results cannot establish a significant valuation difference 
between high- and low-value firms, they still indicate that the high-value firms benefitted the 
most from the tax reform.  
This paper examines only a small potential effect of the corporate tax changes in the TCJA. 
Several other interesting topics could be further explored in this field to supplement our 
findings. Doing a similar study as ours when more data is available would be a natural 
extension of our study and could provide new insights into the topic. If consistent results are 
found in the future, it would support the findings of this paper. Another interesting aspect would 
be how the tax reform affected the financial statements of the acquired firms in our sample. 
Since the TCJA increased the valuations of U.S. targets, this should be reflected in their future 
financial statements by an increase in their after-tax income. Thus, a suggestion for a future 
study is to collect financial data for the firms in our sample and study this panel data to examine 
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whether the premium paid by the acquirers were reflected in the financial performance of the 
target firms.  
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8. Appendix  
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions – Propensity Score Matching 
Below are the definitions of the variables used in the Propensity Score Matching. The data is gathered from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr and 
Orbis databases. 
Variable Description Source 
LN(Revenue) The natural logarithm of the target’s total revenue in the last available year prior 
to the deal announcement date. 
Zephyr  
LN(Assets) The natural logarithm of the target’s total assets in the last available year prior to 
the deal announcement date. 
Zephyr 
LN(Sfunds) The natural logarithm of the target’s shareholders’ funds in the last available 
year prior to the deal announcement date. 
Zephyr 
Firm_age The number of years the target has been in business at the deal announcement 
date, calculated using  
 




Listed Indicator variable set to one for a target firm which was publicly traded at the 
deal announcement date, and zero otherwise.  
 
A firm is considered listed at the deal announcement date if (1) Orbis reports it 
as listed with no IPO or delisting date, (2) Orbis reports it as listed with an IPO 
date prior to the deal announcement date and no delisting date before the deal 
announcement date, or (3) Orbis reports it as unlisted with an IPO date prior the 
deal announcement date and a delisting date after the deal announcement date. 
Orbis 
MNC Indicator variable set to one for a target considered a multinational corporation.  
 
A firm is considered an MNC if Orbis reports one or more countries as its’ 
“Main foreign countries or regions”.  
Orbis 
Deal_year Factor variable for each year in our sample (2010 – 2019). Zephyr 
High_earnings Indicator variable set to one for target firms with an EBITDA scaled on assets 
above 0.15, and zero otherwise. It is calculated using the last available financial 
figures prior to the deal announcement date as follows: 
 





LN(Target_value) The natural logarithm of the target value, calculated using 
 









Factor variable for the industry of both the target and acquirer, as reported by 
Orbis as primary BvD industry. 
 
If multiple industries are reported for either the target or acquirer, we keep the 




Appendix B: Variable Definitions – Difference-in-Differences regression 
Below are the definitions of the variables used in the DiD regressions.  The data is gathered from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database.  
Variable Description Source 
EBITDA 
multiple 










EBITDA is the target’s EBTIDA in the last available year prior to the deal announcement 
date.  
Zephyr 
Post Indicator variable set to one for observations after the TCJA (2018 – 2019), and zero 
otherwise. 
Zephyr 
Treatment Indicator variable set to one for observations with U.S. targets, and zero otherwise.  Zephyr 
Post * 
Treatment 
Interaction variable between Post and Treatment (the DiD estimator) Zephyr 
Hostile_ 
Takeover 
Indicator variable set to one for hostile acquisitions, and zero otherwise. 
 
We include observations where Zephyr adds “Leveraged buy out” or “Hostile bid” as a sub-
deal type. Leveraged buyouts are typically considered a variation of a hostile takeover as it 
is usually not favored by the current management. “Hostile bids” include public takeovers 
where the management board of the target company does not recommend the bid to the 
company’s shareholders.  
Zephyr 
Cash_deal Indicator variable set to one if the only payment method of a deal is cash, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
We include all three types of cash reported by Zephyr: “Cash”, “Cash Reserves” and “Cash 
assumed”.   
Zephyr 





Indicator variable set to one for public takeovers, and zero otherwise.  
 
We include observations where Zephyr adds “Public Takeover” as a sub-deal type. These 
are deals in which the acquirer makes a public offer to the shareholders of a listed target 
company, and the offer results in the acquirer owning all the shares of the target. The target 




Indicator variable set to one for a recommended bid, and zero otherwise.  
 
We include observations where Zephyr adds “Recommended Bid” as a sub-deal type. These 
are deals in which the management board of the target company has agreed that the terms of 
the takeover offer are fair and recommended that their shareholders accept the offer.  
Zephyr 
PE_seller Indicator variable set to one if the seller of a company is a Private Equity or Venture Capital 
company, and zero otherwise.  
 
We include observations where Zephyr adds “Exit”, “Exit – Partial” or “Exit – New Stake” 
as a sub-deal type. These are deals in which the Venture Capital/Private Equity company 
disposes of all its investment in the target company (“Exit”), sells only part of its stake 
(“Exit – Partial”) or sells its stake but also obtains a stake in the company that is acquiring it 
(“Exit – New Stake”).  
Zephyr 
PE_buyer Indicator variable set to one if the buyer of a company is a Private Equity or Venture Capital 
company, and zero otherwise.  
 
We include observations where Zephyr adds “Build Up” as a sub-deal type. These are deals 
in which a Private Equity company builds up the company it owns by acquiring other 
companies to amalgamate into the larger firm, thus increasing the total value of its 
investments through synergies between the acquired companies. 
Zephyr 
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* Numbers in thousands  
 
Appendix C: Countries included in the analysis 
Below is a detailed breakdown of the countries included in our dataset. As evident, we have observations from 32 unique countries in our unmatched 
sample. In general, observations from countries with a low average deal value is not included in the matched sample as they are too different from 
the average U.S. firm. Note that the number of observations in the matched sample for some countries is higher than the number of observations in 
the unmatched sample. This is due to the matching with replacement (control observations can be used more than once). 
              Unmatched (total) sample Matched sample 








1. Australia 247 586,798 12.89 123 3,343,208 20.06 
2. Austria 13 406,269 10.74 2 350,359 10.63 
3. Belgium 60 271,980 17.03 7 802,171 20.86 
4. Canada 242 973,725 12.56 132 3,352,846 12.75 
5. Cyprus 2 207,885 6.33 3 410,953 11.65 
6. Czech Republic 49 159,699 8.50 4 1,312,692 8.58 
7. Denmark 19 486,311 12.99 1 3,200,457 10.87 
8. Estonia 12 50,311 14.72 - - - 
9. Finland 83 365,017 14.75 16 5,117,801 23.75 
10. France 192 461,094 18.70 39 2,822,658 37.40 
11. Germany 142 524,995 17.12 46 1,874,229 35.26 
12. Greece 23 163,639 13.62 - - - 
13. Iceland 2 106,911 10.31 - - - 
14. Ireland 21 2,186,238 17.71 3 42,900,000 16.76 
15. Italy 336 303,238 11.30 45 3,801,367 19.21 
16. Japan 54 1,129,208 12.39 41 2,443,106 12.79 
17. Latvia 1 55,656 4.31 - - - 
18. Luxembourg 4 236,023 9.24 1 715,723 14.49 
19. Netherlands 23 259,581 15.67 2 1,467,584 9.52 
20. New Zealand 37 281,445 10.30 6 1,042,878 8.10 
21. Norway 79 112,441 10.89 15 246,734 14.91 
22. Portugal 63 355,627 12.01 4 1,238,820 21.81 
23. Republic of 
Korea 
367 170,695 13.06 56 1,303,291 11.14 
24. Singapore 18 436,683 7.24 9 529,098 9.29 
25. Slovakia 13 77,837 17.06 2 132,199 17.89 
26. Slovenia 40 66,810 7.61 2 105,155 5.08 
27. Spain 257 323,753 13.88 18 3,580,724 14.40 
28. Sweden 205 80,968 12.10 11 1,231,859 19.38 
29. Switzerland 6 8,545,535 12.73 16 34,978,322 13.20 
30. Taiwan 22 632,487 13.66 13 4,798,839 6.80 
31. United 
Kingdom 
632 278,654 12.81 96 1,668,542 15.40 
32. United States 
of America 
782 4,638,740 16.10 713 3,780,747 16.04 
Total 4046 1,215,484 13.75 1426 3,646,972 16.92 
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* Numbers in thousands 
** Since we are using NN matching with replacement, the control sample will contain duplicated observations. 
These control samples in the pre- and post-period consist of 299 and 54 unique observations, respectively. 
 
Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics for Treatment and Control Firms 
The below panels show descriptive statistics for the treatment (U.S.) and control (foreign) samples before and after matching. The reported 
t-statistics are obtained using a two-sample t-test for a difference in means (treatment vs. control sample). Panel A and B show the samples 
before matching. The high t-statistics across most covariates in both periods (except firm age in post-period) indicate a significant difference 
in the means. This confirms the need for matching. Panel C and D show the samples after matching. As evident, the t-statistics are 
significantly reduced and fall within the default 95% confidence level (t-statistic below 1.96). Thus, there are no longer significant 
differences in the means, and we achieve covariate balancing due to the Propensity Score Matching. 
Panel A: Summary statistics in the pre-period before matching 
 Treatment sample Control sample  
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev t-statistic 
Revenue* 2,124,891 5,884,618 245,134 1,145,335 14.7 
Assets* 2,948,794 7,245,504 298,312 1,246,182 17.1 
Sfunds* 1,039,420 2,389,931 128,018 528,338 17.3 
Target_value* 4,015,506 9,490,778 410,200 1,832,937 17.5 
Firm_age 24.73 20.69 22.72 20.81 2.19 
MNC .2569 .4372 .1193 .3242 8.89 
Listed .5673 .4958 .1764 .3812 21.7 
High_earnings .3394 .4739 .4836 .4998 -6.62 
Observations 654  2415  3069 
      
Panel B: Summary statistics in the post-period before matching 
 Treatment sample Control sample 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev t-statistic 
Revenue* 3,723,014 10,213,474 226,350 1,077,862 9.65 
Assets* 6,435,848 13,503,742 301,475 1,525,663 12.7 
Sfunds* 2,082,524 4,026,026 135,127 617,428 13.1 
Target_value* 7,823,076 14,965,555 353,031 1,188,575 14.3 
Firm_age 24.95 19.98 24.64 22.84 0.14 
MNC .2031 .4039 .0919 .2890 3.83 
Listed .7891 .4096 .1614 .3681 17.7 
High_earnings .1953 .3980 .4888 .5002 -6.34 
Observations 128  849  977 
      
Panel C: Summary statistics in the pre-period after matching 
 Treatment sample Control sample 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev t-statistic 
Revenue* 2,044,449 5,831,724 2,035,846 3,914,263 0.03 
Assets* 2,825,928 7,046,676 2,392,836 4,563,257 1.30 
Sfunds* 1,015,089 2,397,299 1,052,412 1,874,774 -0.31 
Target_value* 3,815,126 9,111,079 3,631,466 7,546,078 0.39 
Firm_age 24.86 20.7 23.06 19.32 1.60 
MNC .2575 .4376 .2970 .4573 -1.57 
Listed .5624 .4965 .5908 .4921 -1.02 
High_earnings .3397 .4740 .3681 .4827 -1.06 
Observations 633  633**  1266 
      
Panel D: Summary statistics in the post-period after matching 
 Treatment sample Control sample 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev t-statistic 
Revenue* 1,772,534 3,330,321 1,794,269 3,266,133 -0.04 
Assets* 3,423,907 9,450,676 2,634,891 3,460,618 0.70 
Sfunds* 1,097,116 2,435,873 1,119,013 1,333,346 -0.07 
Target_value* 3,508,720 8,791,701 2,640,370 2,654,819 0.85 
Firm_age 25.74 20.63 36.29 48.40 -1.79 
MNC .1875 .3928 .2375 .4282 -0.77 
Listed .7000 .4611 .7250 .4493 -0.35 
High_earnings .2125 .4117 .1875 .3928 0.39 
Observations 80  80**  160 
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Appendix E: Industries included in the analysis – unmatched sample 
Below is a detailed breakdown of the industry classifications included in our unmatched sample. The industries of the target and acquirer are 
used as matching covariates in the Propensity Score Matching in addition to industry Fixed Effects in our DiD-regressions. Orbis reports multiple 
variations of industry classification, including SIC, NACE, NAICS, and BvD industry. Classifying firms based on SIC Major Group (2-digits) 
is too narrow, and SIC Industry Group (3-digits) is too wide given our sample size. We instead classify the firms according to the BvD major 
industry as reported by Orbis, consisting of 29 unique industries closely related to the SIC classifications. As evident from the below table, there 
are large variations in the average deal value and EBITDA multiple across the different industries. As expected, the largest EBITDA multiples 
are in Biotechnology & Life Sciences and Computer Software, and the most valuable companies are in Computer Hardware, Media & 
Broadcasting, and Communications.  
 
 Acquirer Target  
Industry Obs. Avg. deal 
Value* 





1. Agriculture, Horticulture & Livestock 19 295,022 25 246,351 13.08 
2. Banking, Insurance & Financial Services 547 927,437 162 1,698,371 13.22 
3. Biotechnology and Life Sciences 37 483,604 44 902,670 22.72 
4. Business Services 493 572,603 377 563,339 12.96 
5. Chemicals, Petroleum, Rubber & Plastic 267 2,661,915 272 2,501,513 14.70 
6. Communications 118 3,652,257 119 1,877,990 11.83 
7. Computer Hardware 23 5,627,370 21 5,970,991 13.88 
8. Computer Software 339 763,695 449 548,484 19.52 
9. Construction 111 367,698 111 352,585 9.38 
10. Food & Tobacco Manufacturing 159 1,491,799 172 1,631,869 14.95 
11. Industrial, Electric & Electronic Machinery 424 1,170,743 440 1,337,753 15.43 
12. Information Services 1 625,328 - - - 
13. Leather, Stone, Clay & Glass products 33 510,631 38 670,944 13.57 
14. Media & Broadcasting 61 1,123,605 80 4,667,460 13.06 
15. Metals & Metal Products 78 224,963 95 458,663 10.05 
16. Mining & Extraction 200 2,275,501 223 1,989,962 11.00 
17. Miscellaneous Manufacturing 20 730,494 27 1,137,335 19.03 
18. Printing & Publishing 48 385,038 44 253,157 6.94 
19. Property Services 90 1,316,847 90 1,505,231 15.81 
20. Public Administration, Education, Health  101 637,519 113 481,546 14.49 
21. Retail 126 1,103,013 159 1,233,856 13.35 
22. Textiles & Clothing Manufacturing 40 389,055 48 571,200 17.00 
23. Transport Manufacturing 92 1,910,277 85 1,156,693 11.36 
24. Transport, Freight & Storage 135 1,277,448 162 1,114,126 11.26 
25. Travel, Personal & Leisure 123 644,837 208 573,065 13.65 
26. Utilities 136 1,926,699 186 1,570,299 10.25 
27. Waste Management & Treatment 18 201,582 35 201,106 13.13 
28. Wholesale 151 735,705 191 586,543 9.98 
29. Wood, Furniture & Paper Manufacturing 56 1,193,843 70 710,961 10.11 
Total 4046 1,215,484 4046 1,215,484 13.75 
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Appendix F: Industries included in the analysis – matched sample 
Below is a detailed breakdown of the industries of the control and treatment groups in the matched sample. As evident from each industry’s percentage 
of the total sample, the matching procedure achieves a good balance between the industries of the control and treatment observations. There are large 
variations in the average deal value and EBITDA multiples across the different industries. The sample contains a high share of high-tech industries 
such as Computer Software and Industrial, Electric & Electronic Machinery with high average EBITDA multiples.  
 Control Treatment   
Industry 














1. Agriculture, Horticulture 
& Livestock 
1 0.1% 526,071 40.45 2 0.3% 1,231,318 17.63 
2. Banking, Insurance & 
Financial Services 
21 2.9% 746,472 12.64 19 2.7% 3,130,071 13.61 
3. Biotechnology and Life 
Sciences 
5 0.7% 2,079,097 36.12 12 1.7% 1,879,324 21.29 
4. Business Services 59 8.3% 2,376,128 11.21 46 6.5% 2,131,243 14.07 
5. Chemicals, Petroleum, 
Rubber & Plastic 
53 7.4% 13,116,848 21.58 55 7.7% 9,130,738 15.39 
6. Communications 15 2.1% 7,122,357 10.61 24 3.4% 4,380,666 14.11 
7. Computer Hardware 8 1.1% 708,567 11.14 8 1.1% 15,414,509 15.11 
8. Computer Software 103 14.4% 1,718,317 30.60 89 12.5% 1,219,786 26.24 
9. Construction 6 0.8% 1,938,777 10.84 6 0.8% 2,437,738 11.70 
10. Food & Tobacco 
Manufacturing 
26 3.6% 4,392,121 12.30 24 3.4% 8,183,448 15.68 
11. Industrial, Electric & 
Electronic Machinery 
125 17.5% 3,253,003 16.44 115 16.1% 2,872,697 19.34 
12. Leather, Stone, Clay & 
Glass products 
9 1.3% 2,107,007 6.59 6 0.8% 1,096,879 14.39 
13. Media & Broadcasting 14 2.0% 3,381,237 12.53 12 1.7% 12,894,787 7.88 
14. Metals & Metal Products 12 1.7% 830,850 16.05 17 2.4% 1,345,079 10.42 
15. Mining & Extraction 48 6.7% 2,836,387 13.90 43 6.0% 4,895,800 12.57 
16. Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing 
5 0.7% 350,521 31.25 9 1.3% 425,103 16.44 
17. Printing & Publishing 6 0.8% 1,118,692 9.05 8 1.1% 930,461 9.01 
18. Property Services 14 2.0% 1,142,905 15.58 27 3.8% 2,508,405 16.20 
19. Public Administration, 
Education, Health  
24 3.4% 1,870,964 40.84 24 3.4% 1,503,817 13.22 
20. Retail 30 4.2% 5,361,046 14.55 31 4.3% 3,450,279 14.33 
21. Textiles & Clothing 
Manufacturing 
6 0.8% 1,927,513 26.88 11 1.5% 1,282,628 13.38 
22. Transport Manufacturing 16 2.2% 1,410,314 14.86 14 2.0% 3,992,155 11.79 
23. Transport, Freight & 
Storage 
13 1.8% 1,756,143 16.45 23 3.2% 5,205,761 12.45 
24. Travel, Personal & 
Leisure 
40 5.6% 3,705,005 11.59 24 3.4% 1,240,197 9.68 
25. Utilities 24 3.4% 1,351,555 9.14 32 4.5% 6,406,140 10.77 
26. Waste Management & 
Treatment 
2 0.3% 439,257 15.23 2 0.3% 115,468 8.52 
27. Wholesale 22 3.1% 6,028,903 10.28 20 2.8% 2,880,663 14.93 
28. Wood, Furniture & 
Paper Manufacturing 
6 0.8% 1,209,056 10.62 10 1.4% 3,346,836 11.89 
Total 713 100% 3,513,196 17.79 713 100.0% 3,780,747 16.04 
